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SCADA system security is a significant United States national security issue based on the 
systems’ vulnerabilities and the cyber threats that seek to exploit them.  Within the last fifteen 
years as SCADA systems have collectively transitioned to Transmission Control Protocol/ 
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks, analysts and policy-makers have expressed increased 
concern over the general security and protection of SCADA systems, which are responsible for 
monitoring and controlling our nation’s critical infrastructure.  SCADA systems are susceptible 
based on their ease of entry and their attractiveness as a target.  In addition, there a number of 
cyber threats such as hackers and malware, insiders, terrorist organizations and state actors that 
are dangerous based on their intent and capabilities.  U.S. government engagement with private 
sector owners and operators of critical infrastructures is essential for mitigating the abundant 


















The primary systems associated with the security and facilitation of industrial and 
facility-based processes are Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.  
SCADA systems have proven to be popular within critical infrastructure industries such as oil 
and gas, water, chemicals, electric power, and pharmaceuticals.  Their ability to significantly 
reduce operating costs as well as improve plant or regional system performance and reliability 
has made SCADA systems an integral part of the utilities industry in the United States since the 
1960s.  
Purpose  
SCADA system security is a significant United States national security issue based on the 
systems’ vulnerabilities and the cyber threats that seek to exploit them.  This paper provides a 
determination and assessment of the consequences of SCADA systems’ collective transition to 
digital Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks.  In order to answer 
this question, this report will:  
1. Provide a thorough SCADA system assessment including a review of its primary network 
and control components and an explanation of how these features interact; 
2. Determine the nature, characteristics, intents and capabilities of the threats to SCADA 
systems; 
3. Describe the level of ease associated with gaining access to SCADA systems as well as 
explain the attractiveness of them as a target in order to assess its overall vulnerability; 
4. Provide possible solutions that exist to address the problem. 
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Considering the vital role that critical infrastructure facilities and networks play in 
society’s basic functionality, it is not enough to protect these resources from external entities that 
threaten them.  After production, efforts and costs of a physical system are primarily allocated 
towards routine supervision and maintenance.  For over fifty years, SCADA systems have 
existed as a technology aimed at making critical infrastructure management efficient.  The data 
collection capabilities of SCADA systems within a facility or dispersed location eliminate 
personnel from spending time physically inspecting facilities and performing maintenance, thus 
minimalizing field site examinations.  Costly after-hours and alarm call-outs can often be 
avoided since a SCADA system will indicate the nature and degree of a problem.  The ability to 
remotely control site equipment may permit an operator at home to postpone a site visit till 
working hours.
1
  Additionally, such systems possess a very reliable alarming system that relays 
critical data immediately to process control, which allow informed network system decisions to 
be made.   
SCADA systems are easy to manipulate and control, largely because of their intuitive 
interfaces and reliable speed.  When graphically displayed, accumulated operating data will often 
indicate a developing problem or an area for process improvement.
2
  In addition, SCADA 
systems can often be accessed remotely through an internet connection on one’s computer, 
laptop, phone or tablet, depending on the capabilities of any particular system.  SCADA systems 
feature an array of advantages that have increased their popularity and usage over time.  Their 
versatility and effectiveness make them an essential component of any industrial control system. 
Despite the enhanced capabilities brought forward by the development of technology 
relating to SCADA systems; this progress has not come without a number of serious security 
                                                             
1 SCADA explained. (2012). Opus Daytonknight,  
2  SCADA explained. (2012). Opus Daytonknight,  
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concerns.  Newly introduced, internet-connective capabilities of SCADA systems have been 
identified as the systems’ primary security concern, amongst many others.  Before the transition 
to TCP/IP digital platforms, SCADA systems lacked Internet capabilities that enabled 
networking and interconnectivity between various systems, making protective features 
unnecessary.   However, this new function has created a channel through which various cyber-
based threats could emerge and infiltrate the security of the systems.  Additionally, many 
SCADA systems that were not immediately supported by necessary cyber-security features such 
as firewalls, routers or anti-virus software created a considerable national security issue for 
government leaders and private-sector ownership alike. 
Within the last fifteen years, analysts, national security leadership and policy-makers 
have expressed increased unease over the general security and protection of critical infrastructure 
systems because of the number of significant threats that currently accompany SCADA systems’ 
security weaknesses.  These threats include but are not limited to malcontented insiders, hackers, 
terrorist organizations and state actors.  The vulnerability of the SCADA systems and the 
attractiveness of a critical infrastructure targets that they administer in combination with the 
intent and capabilities of the previously described threats collectively merit substantial attention 











Understanding the Technical Characteristics of SCADA Systems 
 
Figure 1: The primary components of a SCADA system.
3
 
Industrial Control System (ICS) is a term that is used to refer to multiple types of control 
systems used in the industrial sector and critical infrastructure such as SCADA systems, 
distributed control systems (DCSs) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs).  SCADA 
systems are highly dynamic arrangements that are used to secure and centrally collect data on 
critical infrastructure networks that are oftentimes geographically dispersed.  These systems 
assimilate hardware and software to provide a centralized monitoring and control center that 
features both input and output functions.   
                                                             
3 What is a SCADA system. (2005). Retrieved 12/8, 2013, from 
http://www.veestaworld.com/pages/services_scada_pages.htm 
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In order to understand a SCADA system’s functionality, it is vital to become familiar 
with the major control components of a common industrial control system. 
Control Components: 
 Master Terminal Unit (MTU): Operating as a component of the SCADA master level; the 
MTU acts as the central processing unit of the entire system.  The MTU controls the 
actions of all of the local control units such as the Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and the 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) in addition to the dynamic control functions that 
are completed both automatically and by an operator.   
 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU): “RTUs are field devices that are often equipped with 
wireless radio interfaces to support remote situations where wire-based communications 
are unavailable with the purpose of data acquisition and unit control.
4
”  Along with PLCs, 
RTUSs are the primary technical components of the field level areas that cover the 
systems’ physical scope and are vital to transmitting data to the master system. 
 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC): Like remote terminal units, PLCs are responsible 
for executing many of the same data acquisition and field level maneuvers.  In SCADA 
environments however, PLCs are designed for specific control applications and are 
therefore used often as field devices because they are more economical, versatile, flexible 
and configurable than special-purpose RTUs.
5
  
 Human-Machine Interface (HMI): A HMI is a critical hardware and software element 
that allows human operators to influence and interfere with the system based on company 
management and decision-making.  “The connection between the SCADA master level 
                                                             
4 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
5 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
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and company management allow for operators to monitor the state of a process under 
control, modify control settings to change the control objective, and manually override 
automatic control operations in the event of an emergency.
6
”  This interface also displays 
process status information, historical information, reports, and other information to 
operators, administrators, managers, business partners, and other authorized users
7
. 
 Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED): An IED is a field sensor that is used to acquire data 
and perform control functions in conjunction with other functions at the local control 
level.  “An IED can combine an analog input sensor, analog output sensor, low-level 
control capabilities, a communication system and program memory in one device.
8
”  
These features allow greater interconnectivity and advanced communications capabilities 
at the local level. 
 Data Historian: A systems’ data historian is a database software application that serves to 
record time-based process data.  Typically, historian software offers the features of 
trending software (which includes managing basic system information) with enhanced 
data capturing, data compression, and data presentation capabilities.
9
 
 Input/Output (IO) Server: A SCADA systems’ IO server is responsible for processing the 
data that is transmitted from the primary components of the local control locations via 
communication media.  An IO server can reside on the control server or on a separate 
                                                             
6 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
7  Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
8  Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
9
IHS Global Spec.Trending and historian software information. Retrieved November 26, 2013, from 
http://www.globalspec.com/learnmore/industrial_engineering_software/industrial_controls_software/trending_h
istorian_software 
The Significance of the Transition of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems to TCP/IP Platforms 
11 
computer platform.  IO servers are also used for interfacing third-party control 




 Communication Network: The fieldbus network is a collection of industrial computer 
networks that enable communication with a PLC.  The fieldbus network distributes 
information uniformly to the various field sensors using a specific procedure that 
eliminates narrow sensor-to-sensor interaction. 
 Control Network: The control network establishes interconnectivity amongst the control 
levels that comprise the system such as the SCADA master level and the local control 
level. 
 Communication Router: A router is a communication media device that enables 
interaction between two control networks, including local area networks (LAN) and wide 
area networks (WAN).  In a SCADA system, this connection is between the Main 
Terminal Unit and the Remote Terminal Units to the control network for SCADA 
communication.   
 Firewall: A firewall exists to protect network communication by scanning and controlling 
network communications. 
 Modems.  A modem is a device used to convert between serial digital data and a signal 
suitable for transmission over a telephone line to allow devices to communicate.  
“Modems are often used in SCADA systems to enable long-distance serial 
communications between MTUs and remote field devices.
11
” 
                                                             
10 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
11 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
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 Remote Access Points: Remote access points are distinct devices, areas and locations of a 
control network for remotely configuring control systems and accessing process data.  
Examples include using a personal digital assistant (PDA) to access data over a LAN 
through a wireless access point, and using a laptop and modem connection to remotely 




Understanding the Interactive Functions of a SCADA System 
SCADA systems feature relationships between several vital control and network 
mechanisms that operate together in unison in order to control and collect data on network 
operations.  Because these systems are used in delivery systems that span over broad physical 
areas such as water, oil and electrical distribution systems, the importance of having strong 
network connectivity is high. 
 
SCADA Hardware and Software 
Today, the common SCADA system consists of user operation workstations, SCADA 
server computers, communication networks, programmable field controllers and field devices 
and signals.  “Typical hardware includes a master terminal unit placed at the control center, 
communications equipment (e.g. radio telephone line, cable, or satellite), and one or more 
geographically distributed field sites consisting of either a remote terminal unit or a 
programmable logic controller.
13
”  Functionally, the remote terminal units and programmable 
logic controllers gather specific data about the network structure that it monitors (such as where 
                                                             
12 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
13 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
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a leak on a pipeline has occurred) and records the data as unique.  The data is then transitioned 
through the input/output server (communication hardware) to a central command site where the 
master terminal unit is located where it stores and processes the information.  The system 
ultimately alerts the home station that a leak has occurred by carrying out necessary analysis 
such as determining the critical characteristics of the situation.  This information is presented in a 
clear and organized layout, providing supervisors with actionable intelligence.  Graphic 2 
illustrates the basic architecture of a SCADA system. 
 




These functions are controlled through the SCADA software and network components.  
The network features are mostly uniform throughout most industrial control systems and include 
many of the devices that were outlined previously such as the communication router, the control 
network, and the remote access points.  However, a systems’ software is unique, with respect to 
not only the type of industrial control system that it is employed in such as water, power or 
                                                             
14 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
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electric, but also each SCADA system specifically.  Each system has its own specific 
architecture and functionality, and these elements must be considered in the software creation 
stages.  However, there are baseline software functions that are programmed to tell the system 
what and when to monitor, what parameter ranges are acceptable, and what response to initiate 
when parameters change outside acceptable values.
15
  These principles apply to the software of 
the five basic components of any SCADA system architecture. 
 
SCADA System Architecture 
 Field devices and signals are the portals through which data is transmitted in or from the 
PLC in either a discrete form or an analog form.  Their function in relation to the other signals 
and devices must be considered when designing the system software.  Field devices may be 
signal transmitters, such as level or pressure transmitters; they could be discrete signals, such as 
a valve’s open or closed status or the motors’ running status.  “Some devices may actually 
provide multiple signals, such as a water quality unit, which provides both chlorine residual and 
water pH. 
16
”  Once all of the field signals have been identified for each of the process areas, the 
connections can be made through the SCADA software.   
 A SCADA system is divided into multiple process areas that have their own function to 
be executed.  Each one of these locations require a PLC or RTU that executes data acquisition 
and field level maneuvers.  For example, “a pumping station may use two or three pumps, 
operating in a lead/lag/standby mode; the automation program in the controller is configured to 
operate the pumps based upon operator-entered setpoints and duty assignments that are executed 
                                                             
15 Stoufer, K., Falco,J., & Kent,K.Guide to supervisory and data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial control systems 
security. 
16 McCrady, S. (2013). The elements of SCADA software. Designing SCADA application software: A practical 
approach (pp. 11-23) 
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through the programmable logic controller.
17
”  After the software designer allocates the proper 
I/O signals to each PLC, organizing them according to input/output and discrete/abstract the 
system will be ready for communicative functions at the local control level.   
 The human machine interface, or the user workstation, is the graphic display that allows 
for an operator to control system functionality and control data acquisition.  The software at this 
level involves the creation of the process control displays, historical trend and historical report 
displays, alarm and event summary displays, and the process database.
18
  This can be established 
through the programming of the graphic displays associated with the links in the process 
database as well as the programming of the communications interface for the RTUs and the 
PLCs. 
 The communication network for a SCADA system connects the SCADA 
master/company management level with the various local control levels that are spatially 
dispersed.  The three basic topologies for communication networks as they pertain to SCADA 
systems include bus, star, and token ring networks.
19
  While all of these networks connect the 
essential nodes of the SCADA together in their own way, they all serve the same connective 
function; albeit each method of communication is used depending amount and importance of the 
data being transmitted.  Having a secure communication network is essential in order to ensure 
that the control and network functions cannot be interrupted externally. 
 The SCADA server computer is the system device that maintains all communicative and 
data acquisition functionality.  Historical data collected over time is maintained on the server 
                                                             
17 McCrady, S. (2013). The elements of SCADA software. Designing SCADA application software: A practical 
approach (pp. 11-23) 
18 McCrady, S. (2013). The elements of SCADA software. Designing SCADA application software: A practical 
approach (pp. 11-23) 
19 McCrady, S. (2013). The elements of SCADA software. Designing SCADA application software: A practical 
approach (pp. 11-23) 
The Significance of the Transition of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems to TCP/IP Platforms 
16 
computer in the form of databases.  Current system operating data from all of the field 
controllers is also maintained in databases on the server computer.
20
  This historical data is 
continuously updated with new data that is acquired via communications with the PLCs and the 
RTUs, which is ultimately a function made through the server computer.  Another purpose of the 
SCADA server computer is to provide an interface to other facilities, typically through the 
Internet, using firewalls and SQL interface calls.  “It is important that the outside access cannot 
interfere with the internal operations of the SCADA system, so the server computer often 
provides a secure interface.
21
”  It is through the server computer that interconnectivity amongst 
various facilities accomplishes data sharing and other interactive features.    
 Ultimately, all of these components combine to create an industrial control system that is 
able to monitor and control industrial processes while including multiple sites over long 
distances.  Identifying the primary control and network components that comprise the makeup of 
SCADA systems allows for a fundamental understanding of the system itself, which in turn 
enables a more comprehensive view of what vulnerabilities exist within the system and how they 







                                                             
20 McCrady, S. (2013). The elements of SCADA software. Designing SCADA application software: A practical 
approach (pp. 11-23) 
21 McCrady, S. (2013). The elements of SCADA software. Designing SCADA application software: A practical 
approach (pp. 11-23) 




American National Security – A Broad Overview 
According to Clark Kent Ervin at the Aspen Institute, terrorists remain fixated on an 
aviation-style attack, with the intention of inspiring fear in American citizens that permeates 
down to the most basic 
levels of society.  While 
we remain vulnerable in 
the aviation sector, it 
remains our strongest area 
of security.   Therefore, if a 
successful attack were 
implemented on our 
airplanes, it would be 
evident that the United 
States is vulnerable, even 
at its strongest area.  
However, with our 
improved technology and 
public awareness, it will be 
very difficult for terrorists to execute an attack similar to the one that was launched against the 
American people on 9/11.   
Figure 3: 9/11 reminds us why strong national security is vital. 
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Air cargo, is an extreme concern, because it goes through far less extensive screening 
compared to carry-on and passenger luggage.  Right now, explosives are the chief concern 
among national security representatives yet TSA representatives constantly scan for guns and 
knives as well.  Maritime cargo presents a far larger threat as only 5% of maritime cargo 
containers are inspected for radioactive materials. Mass transit also remains a large threat based 
on the nature of American transportation in that 85% of critical infrastructure in the U.S. is 
privately owned and operated by those who may value profit over security.  It would be 
advantageous for the government to collaborate with these private companies in order to ensure 
greater security because the products and services produced by private firms are not limited by 
government regulations. 
Finally, the status of America’s national security is concerning for a number of reasons.  
First, the geographic dimensions of the United States present inevitable limitations to those in 
charge of overseeing our national security based on the size of our borders.  Second, the 
importance of intelligence and national security is illuminated through these vulnerabilities in 
part because Americans tend to be more reactive than proactive.  Third, biological and chemical 
weapons remain an issue – very little technology has been developed to detect them.  Fourth, 
resources in the tight budgetary times of 2014 prevent the United States from implementing the 
proper actions and purchases necessary to build our national security to protect against various 
threats.  Fifth, both northern and southern borders remain extremely vulnerable as evidenced by 
the number of illegal aliens that come into the U.S. with ease.  Sixth, the same principle of 
unavoidable limits mentioned earlier can be applied on a case by case basis when it comes to 
situations where action could have been taken to prevent a possible attack, yet none was taken.  
For example, before 9/11 had occurred, one of the hijackers who would eventually become 
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involved in the attack had taken flight lessons in order to learn how to operate a plane.  During 
these lessons, the man was not interested in learning how to land the plane.  The instructor 
thought this was odd, yet did nothing in the way of altering authorization. This is an example of 
this principle of inevitable limitations.  In the event of a designed terrorist attack, there are 
simply too many acts that have to be prevented over the course of time.  Despite all of these 
threats to American national security, it seems that the most alarming threats to the United States 




Industry, finance, intellectual property, technology, culture, policy and diplomacy are 
some of the many areas in which the United States has become dependent on the cyber domain.
22
  
The functionalities of the cyber domain include the creation, transmission and utilization of 
digital information.  “Voice, video and data communications are transmitted through wired and 
wireless mediums to a range of connected devices that can include desktop and laptop 
computers, smart phones, mainframes, televisions, radios, supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems, sensor and navigation systems and communication satellites.
23
” 
This empowers global communication and information-sharing to occur, which in turn facilitates 
the evolution of capabilities in nearly every aspect of life.  This communication comes in the 
form of digitalized content, digital devices and services and telecommunications, which forms an 
increasingly interdependent cyber domain.  Obviously, the United States has an extremely large 
                                                             
22 Kahn, R., McConnell, M., Joseph, N., & Schwartz, P. (2011). America's cyber future.  
23 Kahn, R., McConnell, M., Joseph, N., & Schwartz, P. (2011). America's cyber future.  
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digital footprint within the cyber sphere that transcends international boundaries and potential 
language barriers.   
Cyber terrorism can be defined as: “the use of computers as weapons, or as targets, by 
politically motivated international or sub-national groups, or clandestine agents who threaten or 
cause violence and fear in order to influence an audience, or cause a government to change its 
policies.
24
”  Ever since the early 1990s and early 2000s, cyber-based threats have been 
recognized by analysts as “the next big threat to American national security,” or “the looming 
threat over the horizon.”  Before 9/11, a number of exercises identified apparent vulnerabilities 
in the computer networks of the United States military and energy sectors, which raised a 
moderate level of apprehension.  Following the events of 9/11, the security and terrorism 
discourse soon featured cyber terrorism prominently, promoted by interested representatives of 
the political, business and security circles.
25
   Cyber terrorism has now undoubtedly become a 
global defense issue that governments around the world have to account for. 
Foreign agents are attempting to expose the vulnerabilities of the national security of the 
United States.  Americans themselves, as well as foreign adversaries, have identified the realm of 
cyber security as a potential weak spot for the United States.
26
  This exposure exists for a number 
of reasons, but perhaps the most profound evidence of this lies in the United States’ growing 
dependency on the information technology (IT) that supports nearly all aspects of American 
society.   “Data collection, processing, storage and transmission capabilities are increasing 
                                                             
24 Wilson, C. (2005, April 01). The navy department library. Retrieved from 
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/computerattack.htm 
25 Weimann, G. (2004, May). United states institute of peace. Retrieved from 
http://www.usip.org/publications/cyberterrorism-how-real-threat 
26 Unclassified statement for the record on the worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community for 
the senate select committee on intelligence: Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified statement for the 
record on the worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community for the senate select committee on 
intelligence: (2012). 
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exponentially; meanwhile mobile, wireless and cloud competing bring the full power of the 
globally-connected Internet to a myriad of personal devices.
27
”   Despite all of the improvement 
and innovation of the capabilities of technology and network systems, this progress has 
outstripped advancements in security.  Neither the public nor the private sectors have 
emphasized enough focus into the implementation of proper security measures.  The threat of a 
cyber-attack is recognized in the intelligence community as considerable based on the nature, 
scope, and potential for disarray that characterizes cyber-security incidents, as well as the range 
of actors and targets involved.   
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of the emerging threat of cyber-terrorism is the 
potential for an attack to be launched on network systems that would affect American critical 
infrastructure.  “Critical infrastructure is defined as the assets, systems and networks, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would 
have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any 
combination thereof.
28
”  This can include but is not limited to electricity generation, gas 
production, oil production and distribution, transportation (railroads, highways, airports, ports, 
inland shipping), public health facilities (hospitals, ambulances), food production, water supply 
(drinking water, sewage), telecommunication, security services (police, military) and heating 
(natural gas, fuel).  These resources serve as the backbone of any country; but in the United 
States, a nation with well over 300 million people, critical infrastructure plays a particularly 
indispensable role especially considering the America’s dependency on technology.   
                                                             
27 Unclassified statement for the record on the worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community for 
the senate select committee on intelligence: Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified statement for the 
record on the worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community for the senate select committee on 
intelligence: (2012).  
28 Critical infrastructure sectors. (2014). Retrieved 4-16, 2013,  
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The challenge of a cyber-based national security breach is not a new one for the United 
States, but the elevated threat towards the nation’s critical infrastructure is.  The enhancement of 
computer literacy and technological capabilities has ushered in better competency in hackers, 
terrorist organizations and adversarial nation-states.  Perhaps the most plausible approach a 
challenger may take when aiming to negatively influence the function of American critical 
infrastructure is through the infiltration of SCADA systems.  Additionally, a number of 
vulnerabilities within the systems have been identified as significantly concerning.   
Ultimately, the current security status of SCADA systems illuminates and uncovers a 
striking national security liability.  Combine this factor with the potential impact of an attack on 
American critical infrastructure, and it becomes increasingly apparent that the United States must 
find a way to mitigate the threats and weaknesses that exist to potentially cause harm to the 
backbone of the country.  This report will examine such threats and vulnerabilities to the critical 
infrastructure system within the United States in order to determine the prospective impact that 
an attack could have.   
 
Significant Threats to SCADA System Security 
Ever since critical infrastructure made the transition to TCP/IP platforms, numerous 
threats have been identified as significantly problematic by intelligence analysts and policy-
makers.  Malware can introduce SCADA systems to viruses, worms, Trojan-horse attacks, and 
spyware.  Insiders such as disgruntled workers can pose a very substantial threat to any sensitive 
system, based on the person’s easy accessibility to both physical and digital areas of the system 
and their ability to manipulate it in a way that an outsider may not be able to.  Hackers also 
present noteworthy security risks through their interest in probing, intruding or controlling a 
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system because of the challenge it presents.  Lastly, terrorist organizations and state actors are 
threats to United States’ critical infrastructure and SCADA systems based on their greater 
capabilities through access to resources and bolder intent driven by potentially anti-American 
ideologies.   
These five threats can be explained by conducting an analysis that examines all of the 
available information concerning potential adversaries in conjunction with its intent and 
capabilities.   
 
Hackers and Malware 
 The process of hacking refers to someone breaking into a computer or network, usually 
by exploiting an existing flaw.
29
  Malware is an abbreviated term meaning “malicious software,” 
and refers to software that is specifically designed to secretly access one’s computer, or server, 
and compromise its main functions, steal data, bypass access controls or otherwise harm the 
computer.
30
  It is important to understand the relationship between these two terms because they 
are central towards identifying the different types of attacks that one could encounter through the 
Internet.  Malicious hacking is an action that is primarily represented by those that are driven by 
the desire for profit, protest, or challenge, and has spawned a subculture of individuals that are 
drawn to its characteristics.  As computer science has evolved, so too have the capabilities of 
malicious software which has primarily been developed and disseminated by those in the 
hacking community who are known as “black hats.”  Malware has largely been the apparatus 
through which hacking has operated since its inception, which includes multiple motives behind 
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its use itself.  Malware can be used to hack into a network or system in order exploit 
vulnerabilities or acquire data, or it can be used to simply inflict damage to another computer for 
no real reason.  To understand malicious hacking, is to understand malware. 
Like any IT system, SCADA systems are potentially vulnerable to viruses, worms, 
Trojans and spyware.  This may be the only identified threat that could be characterized as 
indirect and therefore potentially unintentional attack; however it could still very well impact the 
system by corrupting data, overwhelming communications, installing back doors or key stroke 
loggers.  Although this is a negative element that could be presented by a hacker or other 
adversarial agent, it is not uncommon to see malicious software accidentally introduced by 
employees who unknowingly connect flash drives that are not compatible with the SCADA 
system software or contain harmful files of their own.  Regardless of whether or not malicious 
software is embedded in a system directly or incidentally through various backchannels, malware 
original design was created with the goal of destruction and manipulation in mind making it a 
constant and serious threat.   
The primary elements behind intent include both desire and expectation.  In the case of 
routine malicious software, the elements that comprise intent take on a different meaning based 
on the fact that the malware program has no control over any specific target program.  Instead, 
the input of the target program is taken over by the malicious outputs from the malware’s 
program.  “The malware programs’ outputs are referred to as attack goals which are divided into 
two different types of security attacks: memory-based (such as buffer overflow or format string 
attacks) and function-call-based attacks.
31
”  Function-call-based attacks generally comprise the 
focus of cyber-attacks because they produce hostile actions directed at the target program or 
system.  “Most of today’s viruses, worms, Trojans, backdoors, Denial of Service (DoS) tools and 
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other hacking tools that are written in high-level computer languages such as C/C++ are function 
function-call-based attacks that involve malevolent actions such as opening a TCP port to send a 
copy to itself to remote machines, dropping a backdoor, deleting or interception sensitive 
information, modifying system configurations of the victim’s machine, and so on.
32
”   Defining 
the key terminology of the various types of malicious software is a critical component towards 
understanding what it is generally capable of: 
 Viruses: “A computer program that is usually hidden within another seemingly innocuous 
program and that produces copies of itself, inserts them into other programs, and usually 
performs a malicious action such as destroying data.
33
” 
 Worms: In contrast to viruses, which require the spreading of an infected host file, worms 
are standalone software and do not require a host program or human help to propagate.  
“A worm enters a computer through a vulnerability in the system and takes advantage of 




 Trojan Horse: Users are typically tricked into loading and executing it on their systems. 
“After it is activated, it can achieve any number of attacks on the host, from irritating the 
user (popping up windows or changing desktops) to damaging the host (deleting files, 
stealing data, or activating and spreading other malware, such as viruses).
35
” 
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 Spyware/Adware: Software that is installed in a computer without the user’s knowledge 




 Backdoors: A backdoor is an undocumented way of accessing a system, done by 
bypassing the normal authentication mechanisms.  “Usually attackers use backdoors for 
easier and continued access to a system after it has been compromised.
37
”   
 Bots: A malicious bot is self-propagating malware designed to infect a host and connect 
back to a central server or servers that act as a command and control (C&C) center for an 
entire network of compromised devices, or “botnet.”  With a botnet, attackers can launch 




Based on the danger that malware can present to any program, it is vital to protect 
SCADA systems from this type of threat.  Malware designers employ various motives when they 
set out to distribute harmful software throughout cyberspace.  The incentive for such an act 
originated as experiments and pranks but the black-hat community has evolved towards the 
deliberate destruction of targeted programs and systems.  Today, much of malware is created for 
profit through forced advertising (adware), stealing sensitive information (spyware), spreading 
email spam or child pornography (zombie computers) or extorting money (ransomware).
39
  By 
analyzing the outputs of a malicious program, it is clear that malware is created with the intent to 
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corrupt a computer’s functionality and has manifested in the form of malware and assorted 
cyber-attacks.  Considering the dynamic and dangerous capabilities that characterize malware, 
the threat that malware pose to SCADA system is considerable.   
In light of the threat that malware pose to various networks and systems, it is vital to 
understand the culture of hacking.  Black-hat hackers are not only the developers and the 
disseminators of malicious software across cyberspace, but they are most importantly the 
enablers.  Without hackers, malware might only exist as a routine nuisance for computer users.  
Although the hacking community is certainly not uniform, it seems that it is bound by many of 
the same characteristics that define the counterculture, but obviously includes a focus on 
information and communication technologies.  The malicious hacker profile might generally be 
characterized by a person who is involved in countercultural activism with some type of political 
commitment and is fascinated with the opportunities afforded by the world of hacking and 
programming.
40
  Whether it is through spreading viruses, cracking software or manipulating 
networks, the hacking community is united and collaborative across its various subcultures, no 
matter the motivation.   Certain hacking cultures are driven by political and or cultural ideology; 
some hack for financial gain and others do so for sport.  Yet, this culture is a loosely networked 
collection of subcultures that is nevertheless conscious of some important shared experiences, 
shared roots, and shared values.
41
   
In relation to SCADA systems and critical infrastructure protection, the computer hacker 
remains a serious threat.  Recently an article in The Washington Times reported that the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is warning that hackers from the loose online protest 
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collective called Anonymous have threatened attacks against the computer systems that run 
factories, power stations, chemical plants, and water and sewage facilities.
42
   The statement goes 
on to warn that SCADA systems are considered amongst the most the attractive targets for 
hackers and that they “could be able to develop capabilities to gain access and trespass on 
industrial control system networks very quickly.
43
” Compared to the other primary cyber threats 
against SCADA systems, the hacking community is much more individualistic and isolated.  
While not all hackers share identical or even similar objectives or capabilities, it important to 
recognize there is a small percentage of hacking community that does have the intent and 
resources to potentially inflict serious harm on SCADA system networks which could impose 
serious harm on SCADA networks. 
 
Insiders 
An insider can be defined as a disgruntled employee, contractor or business partner that 
could potentially use his or her privileged knowledge to exploit a particular system they have 
access to.  The insider may be motivated to damage or disrupt a SCADA system or the utility’s 
physical system based on the desire to gain higher privileges, displeasure with organizational 
decision-making or salary-based frustration.  Insiders can obtain a great deal of knowledge about 
computer intrusions because their understanding of a target system often allows them to gain 
unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to steal system data.
44
  A resentful 
individual who knows the system can potentially be the most significant threat to any kind of 
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system, based on the person’s easy accessibility to the software and ability to manipulate it.  The 
insider threat also includes outsourcing vendors as well as employees who accidentally introduce 
malware into systems.
45
  The threat level of an insider exploiting a SCADA system is dependent 
on a case-by-case basis.  Although the motivation to commit a deliberate insider attack is often 
not enough to influence an individual to act, the knowledge and resources available to various 
employees, contractors or business partners makes an insider attack an ever-present and 
dangerous possibility.   
 
Terrorist Organizations  
 The goal of terrorism is to inconvenience and inspire fear, not simply to kill a significant 
amount of people.  This can cause a daily, corrosive effect on the way a society operates by 
influencing the basic decisions one could make in a day.  Organized terror manifested strongly 
during the Clinton presidency with the 1993 World Trade Center bombings in New York, 
including related conspiracies; the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing; the 1998 East Africa 
bombings; and the Tokyo sarin-gas attack in 1995.
46
  Over the course of roughly the last two 
decades, a new wave of religiously-motivated terrorism has accompanied the old standard of 
state-sponsored terrorism.  Specifically, terrorist organizations founded on Islamic extremist 
principles such as al-Qaeda, Hamas and the Taliban have spread violence and intimidation 
globally since in the late-1980s.  U.S. analysts believe that religiously motivated terrorism will 
persist for many years and that its Islamic manifestation will remain a threat regardless of what 
occurs to the respective leaders of each organization.
47
  Today, American society has become 
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increasingly vigilant of the characteristics of Islamic terrorism as a result of the 9/11 attacks and 
the more recent Boston Marathon bombing.  Likewise, the US government has recognized the 
shift from state-on-state military action to the emergence of the terrorist threat as evidence of the 
immense amount of resources that have been devoted towards security across a multitude of 
applications. 
 In order to understand the intent that terrorist organizations pose against SCADA 
systems, becoming familiar with the nuances that characterize Islamic theology with extremist 
ideology is critical.  Jihadi Salafist, or Islamic extremism, is represented by a small sect of the 
Muslim religion that believes in a strict interpretation of the Tawhid and Jihad theological 
ideology.  In mainstream Islam, Tawhid is a “doctrine of oneness” that asserts that there is only 
one god, he only has no partners meaning that only he has the right to be worshiped, and anyone 
who worships another god is sinning.  Conversely, Islamic extremism interprets that anyone who 
even claims to have sovereignty or makes laws is making himself into a god and must be killed.  
This is why al-Qaeda and the Taliban are moved to use violence to achieve their political 
objectives.  Moreover, these terrorist organizations have promoted the idea of wala’ wa’l-bara’a 
which refers to an Islamic alliance and disavowal specific to extremism; that only those who 
agree fully with their ideology is truly Muslim, thus those who do not are disinherited and can be 
killed without prosecution.  Today, jihad is commonly understood as an internal struggle and 
defensive war in order to establish a just society.  Conversely, terrorist extremists interpret this 
notion as an individual duty that is a personal matter for each individual with a focus towards 
waging war against the impurities of society, namely other Muslims that do not align with their 
line of thought.  This explains why for every on non-Muslim killed, eight Muslims are. 
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 For al-Qaeda specifically, their objectives consist of a number of incremental steps they 
believe will result in a just global society: 
 Remove non-Muslim occupiers and the current “apostate” rulers. 
 Impose their version of Shari’a law. 
 Set up emirates (governments) under their ideology. 
 Create the caliphate, or governing body.  Without this in place, everyone is living in sin. 
 Make god’s word the highest; achieved through conquering the world and forcing 
everyone to align with Islamic extremism. 
The means towards these goals include: 
 Attack America and its allies. 
 Fight the jihad in order to impose their Shari’a law.   
 Unify the jihad. 
 Incite and coalesce the Ummah (the Islamic unity). 
 Command right and forbid wrong: the only thing one is allowed to do is live the 
extremist life.   
 
The mission of al-Qaeda, like other extremist terrorist groups, is a global one.  To these 
groups, the U.S. is not at the center of their objectives.  The events of 9/11 made most Americans 
believe that al-Qaeda was and still is driven by destruction of America and her allies.  Instead, al-
Qaeda’s goals include overthrowing the current governments and establishing Islamic emirates, 
with the ultimate objective of creating a “caliphate” government that would be about Islamic 
extremism and would chiefly reign over what currently constitutes the current Muslim world that 
spans across the Middle East, South and Central Asia, Africa, and southern Europe.  Of course, 
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the destruction of the United States remains a very high priority across different terrorist 
leadership. Based on evidence collected in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has a “high level of interest” in 
DC and SCADA devices.
48
   From an intent-related perspective, it is unlikely that there is a 
malicious entity that desires to tear down the United States more than the leading terrorist 
organizations.  Therefore, critical infrastructure is and will continue to remain a leading 
attractive target for terrorist leadership going forward based on not only the collateral damage 
that an attack would have, but also the immense fear that it could potentially impose. 
 Considering the motivation to attack the United States that define terrorist agenda, it is 
vital to understand the primary capabilities across these extremist organizations, specifically in 
the cyber realm.  This is the threat that distinguishes critical infrastructure from most IT systems.  
A terrorist organization is likely to seek to disable the SCADA system to disrupt its monitoring 
and control capability, take control of the system to feed false values to the operators or use the 
control system to degrade service or possibly damage the physical critical infrastructure 
system.
49
  For national security officials, part of understanding and preparing for such a 
possibility includes identifying what terrorist organizations are capable of in cyberspace.  
Although there have been no major cyber-attacks caused by groups that have taken lives or 
caused severe physical destruction, some government experts believe that terrorists are at the 
point where they may be able to use the Internet as a direct investment to cause casualties, either 
alone or in conjunction with a physical attack.
50
  Digging deeper, U.S. security agencies are able 
to analyze the cyber activity of terrorist organizations in order to anticipate where and how an 
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attack could be carried out.  “The discovery in Afghanistan of a computer containing structural 
analysis programs for dams, combined with an increase in Web traffic relating to SCADA 
systems, prompted the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) to issue a warning 
information bulletin.
51
”  An analysis of cyber-attack data collected during the second half of 
2001 showed that the corporate systems of energy industry companies are attacked twice as often 
as other industries, and that a large number of these attacks originate from the Middle East.
52
   
As the emphasis for cyber-related capabilities have increased exponentially in recent 
years, intelligence continues to suggest that the technical capabilities of members of terrorist 
organizations are increasing.  “A recent study of more than 200,000 multimedia documents on 86 
sample websites concluded that extremists exhibited similar levels of web knowledge as U.S. 
government agencies, and that the terrorist websites employed significantly more sophisticated 
multimedia technologies than U.S. government websites.
53
”  Perceived anonymity allows for the 
terrorist member to feel safer, which has allowed their organizations to begin to thrive in 
cyberspace.  According to the CIA, various groups, including al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, are 
becoming more adept at using the Internet and computer technologies, and these groups could 
possibly develop the skills necessary for a cyber-attack.
54
  This assertion is supported by 
intelligence that suggests that senior leadership in al-Qaeda has access to the most modern 
technology equipment.  The Washington Times has reported that Islamic extremists are calling 
for the establishment of an Islamist hackers’ army to plan cyber-attacks the U.S. government and 
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that postings on the extremist bulletin board, al-Farooq, carry detailed cyber-attack instructions, 
and include spyware programs for download that can be used to learn the passwords of targeted 
users.
55
  It is evident that the strong motivation to attack the United States that is supported by a 
number of Islamic extremist organizations is materializing into a wide array of potentially 
dangerous technical capabilities.   
 
State Actors  
 Just as terrorist organizations remain unrivaled in their desire and expectation to 
influence a SCADA system, state actors are the leaders when it comes to capabilities in the cyber 
realm.  Therefore, it is vital to identify the state actors that have the strongest desire to attack 
U.S. critical infrastructure and examine their cyber capabilities accordingly.   In today’s current 
geopolitical landscape, Russia and China are the leading threats to the United States from a 
cybersecurity perspective based on intent and capability.  In An Unclassified Statement for the 
Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate 
Committee on Armed Forces, National Intelligence Director James Clapper stated, “Among state 
actors, China and Russia are of particular concern.  As indicated in the October 2011 biennial 
economic espionage report from the National Counterintelligence Executive, entities within 
these countries are responsible for extensive illicit intrusions into US computer networks and 
theft of US intellectual property.
56
”  This section will examine what makes Russia and China the 
leading state actor-cyber threats to SCADA systems.   
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 The Georgian conflict in 2008, the Syrian uprising and the Edward Snowden affair are a 
few examples of recent instances that have tested and strained U.S.-Russian relations.  Tensions 
between the United States and Russia that have been developing in recent years are currently 
accelerating due to the situation involving the Ukraine.   The foreign policy of Russia’s 
government appears more confident and assertive as its standing on the world stage continues to 
become more influential.  This foreign policy which is promoted by the policy-making elite is 
characterized by a deep-seated desire to prove to the rest of the world that Russia is in fact a 
great power that acts independently of the West
57
, is shaped in part by internal cyber capabilities, 
policy and practice.   
Russia’s cyber warfare doctrine uses offensive cyber weapons as a force multiplier, a 
military term that describes a weapon or tactic, which significantly increases combat potential 
when used alongside other military capabilities.  Additionally, their cyber strategy emphasizes 
the ability to disrupt its adversaries’ information infrastructure, military and civilian 
communications and critical infrastructure prior before traditional military operations 
commence.
58
   Moreover, “Russia holds a broad concept of information warfare, which includes 
intelligence, counterintelligence, deceit, disinformation, electronic warfare, debilitation of 
communications, degradation of navigation support, psychological pressure, degradation of 
information systems and propaganda.
59
”  This manifests itself in Russia’s larger military doctrine 
which calls for “prior implementation of measures of informational warfare in order to achieve 
political objectives without the utilization of military forces.
60
” These objectives make sense 
considering the current international political climate, where the traditional physical war has 
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been all but replaced by economic and resource acquisition tactics aimed at gaining leverage in 
the global scheme.  The Russians’ relationship with the United States is not a friendly one, and it 
would be foolish for American leadership to ignore the threats that Russian cyber capabilities 
could pose against its national security.  
 A number of factors make Russia a threat in the cyber realm.  In his book Cyber War, 
former White House cyber coordinator Richard Clarke writes, “The Russians are definitely better 
[than China], almost as good as we are…Russian cyber operations are rarely discovered, which 
is the true measure of a successful op.
61
”  In addition to their efforts to win the war of 
information, Russia’s cyber capabilities are bolstered by the factor of corruption, which is the 
dominant characteristic of their society in a multitude of facets.  In Russia, the rule of law that is 
replaced by personal relationships and payoffs is entirely subjective based on the objectives 
those who have power.  This has spawned a groundswell of state-sponsored, cyber terrorists who 
have become integrated into the Russian military and conduct strategic espionage against the 
United States.  There are two reasons why Russia sub-contracts some of its cyber work to youth 
groups and criminals.  First it is extremely cost-effective – imagine a reserve force that not only 
does not cost money, but actually makes money when not employed by the state.
62
  Second, use 
of kids and criminals confounds the attribution problem.  Even after extensive cyber forensics, 
attacks are not traced back to government computers.
63
  These corruption tactics not only signify 
Russia’s elevated cyber capabilities, but they also indicate its leadership’s desire to, at minimum, 
win the war of information.  The Office of the U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive 
(NCIX) observes, “Moscow’s highly capable intelligence services are using HUMINT (human 
intelligence), cyber, and other operations to collect economic information and technology to 
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support Russia’s economic development and security.
64
” In addition, there have been recent 
instances that point towards Russia’s intent to undermine the United States, not only from an 
economic standpoint, but also from a security perspective.  In 2009, the Wall Street Journal 
reported that cyber-spies from Russia and China penetrated the U.S. electrical grid, leaving 
behind software programs.  The intruders did not cause damage to U.S. infrastructure, but sought 
to navigate the systems and their controls.
65
   In addition, a Los Angeles water system, an Illinois 
water pump and a Houston water utility were all reportedly attacked in 2011 by Russian 
computer hackers.
66
  Even more alarmingly, the Houston location was supposedly protected only 
by a three-letter password. 
67
  These actions confirm that Russian leadership has both the intent 
and capabilities to inflict harm on U.S. critical infrastructure, specifically SCADA systems.  
Russia’s extensive attacks on U.S. research and development have resulted in Russia being 
deemed (along with China), “a national long-term strategic threat to the United States,
68
” by the 
NCIX. 
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 China presents a similar cyber threat to U.S. national security and from an intent 
perspective; they may be more volatile than the Russians.  The Chinese military is over ten years 
into an expansive military modernization program that has played a tremendous role in the 
decision-making and identity of the nation’s leadership.  According to senior American 
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diplomats, China has the ambition, and increasingly the power, to become a regional hegemon
70
, 
and their government recently announced an 11.2 percent increase in military spending, bringing 
the total defense budget for 2012 to $106 billion.
71
  For a nation that is expected to surpass the 
U.S. in defense spending in the year 2038, some argue that China is on a collision course to 
someday collide with the west.  This in turn diversifies the capabilities of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA), and the Pentagon thinks Chinese leadership is intent on acquiring what is called 
“anti-access/area denial” capabilities that use pinpoint ground attack and anti-ship missiles, a 
growing fleet of modern submarines and cyber and anti-satellite weapons to destroy or disable 
another nation's military assets from afar.
72
  However, the extent of China’s military capabilities 
will also be determined by the diplomatic aggressiveness of the government, which American 
diplomats believe is engaged in a determined effort to lock the U.S. out of the Asia-South Pacific 
region.
73
  Undoubtedly, the Chinese and American governments have experienced friction in 
recent years, and this friction expands into the cyber realm. 
 The focus of the Chinese government is characterized by many of the same 
characteristics in the cyber domain. China relies on black hat programmers to exploit 
vulnerabilities in external software that has not yet been discovered by the government; but using 
the underground hacker community is just one of the ways that China is looking to get ahead of 
the U.S. in the information war.  As a part of an integrated national plan, the PLA has adopted a 
formal cyber warfare doctrine that seeks to attain “electronic dominance” by the year 2050, 
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which would include targeting its enemies’ financial markets, military and civilian 
communications.
74
   It is likely that Chinese leadership is using its maturing computer network 
exploitation capability to support intelligence collection against the U.S. government and 
industry by conducting a long term, sophisticated, computer-network exploitation campaign.
75
  
This campaign has manifested itself in a number of different facets, which have indicated the 
scope of China’s cyber capabilities and the intent of its leadership.  It is clear that China 
possesses sophisticated cyber capabilities and has demonstrated a striking level of perseverance, 
evidenced by the sheer number of attacks and acts of espionage that the country commits.
76
  
Additionally, they are widely viewed as an aggressor in cyberspace as the U.S. and other 
Western nations have identified Beijing as has behind cyber-espionage attempts against their 
infrastructure computer systems.
77
  China’s leadership seems to play a large part in the nation’s 
aggressive actions in the global cyber realm.  Reports of the Office of the U.S. National 
Counterintelligence Executive have called out China and its cyber espionage, characterizing 
these activities as rising to the level of strategic threat to the U.S. national interest.  The U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission notes further: “Computer network operations 
have become fundamental to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic campaign goals for 
seizing information dominance early in the military operation.
78
”  China’s efforts appear to be a 
part of its leadership’s larger plan to surpass its adversaries in a number of the primary facets that 
equate to power on the international stage.  China’s aggressive collection efforts appear to be 
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intended to amass data and secrets that will support and further the country’s economic growth, 
scientific and technological capacities, military power, etc. – all with an eye to securing strategic 
advantage in relation to competitor countries and adversaries.
79
  With the U.S. being a leading 
competitor country for the Chinese (and based on their actions that have indicate this as much), it 
is clear that its leadership has both the intent and capabilities to make China a serious threat to 
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A vulnerability analysis identifies, quantifies and ranks vulnerabilities in a system.  
Vulnerability is measured through determining two primary factors.  First is the attractiveness of 
the target which can be assessed by the perceived impact that an attack or hindrance would have 
on a SCADA system.  Second is the ease of attack which is evaluated by the significance of the 
different susceptibilities that might characterize a SCADA system.  Understanding the security 
and vulnerability dynamics behind SCADA systems will help determine how significant 
SCADA system security is amongst America’s national security issues.   
 
Ease of Attack 
 Within the last fifteen years, SCADA system security has become much more difficult 
and complex due to their collective transition to Transition Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) networks, which are the networking models and communication protocols for the 
Internet.  Today, SCADA systems are largely interconnected in order to promote information 
sharing and efficiency.  However, in an industry where the security of industrial control networks 
was once achieved through physical isolation, the collective transition of SCADA systems to the 
Internet has made critical infrastructure dangerously susceptible to attack.  Thus, critical 
infrastructure system vulnerability has increasingly been heralded as an emerging national 
security issue in the United States.    
Due to the fundamental role that SCADA systems play in the processing and 
manipulative functions of many of the critical infrastructure systems in the United States, it is 
important to review their exposures and liabilities.  Considering the move towards 
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interconnectivity in the critical infrastructure industry, there has been an increased effort to the 
address the national security concerns that have been surrounding SCADA systems.  The 
weaknesses that plague these systems are numerous and include:  
 Staff Experience: With a bent for engineering and technical solutions to problems, the 
important role of developing security policies can be foreign to a typical SCADA staff, 
and may therefore not be sympathetic to IT staff recommendations.  
 Operating System Vulnerabilities: “SCADA systems are faced with many of the routine 
IT operating systems susceptibilities, and a bad test and reports of patch-induced 
problems may cause systems to crash.
80
”  
 Authentication: Because it is not uncommon for SCADA systems to possess identical 
passwords, any sense of authentication and accountability may be lost.
81
  Confidentiality 
of authentication is often compromised by the use of clear text transmissions. 
 Remote Access: Because of the economics of staffing control centers around the clock, it 
is not uncommon for SCADA systems to be configured with remote access, creating 
another avenue for trespassers to obtain access of the system. 
 Interconnectivity: The more connections a system possesses, the more exposure and 
vulnerability it is susceptible to.  “Economic and enterprise pressures often result in an 
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 Monitoring and Defenses: The use of Intrusion Detection Software (IDS) is not common 
and firewall and antivirus software has not been a frequent implementation for those in 
charge of SCADA system security due to staff cutbacks and higher drives for efficiency. 
 Wireless: “SCADA systems often use microwave, data radios and cellular packet services 
for communication, which may present various opportunities for foreign entry, depending 
on the implementation of the wireless network.
83
” 
 Remote Processors: Certain classes of remote processors have been recognized as 
security vulnerabilities because their computation power and memory resources are 
diffident and incongruous for security upgrades, as well as the fact that they typically stay 
in place for ten years or more once they are installed.  The result is vulnerable equipment 
that is not easily or inexpensively replaced. 
 SCADA Software: The SCADA application software has modest security features and 
additional format weaknesses. 
 Public Information: It is not uncommon for SCADA system owners to have published 
papers on the design of their system at a time when security was not a priority; a factor 
that may eventually breach the security of the system. 
 Physical Security: SCADA systems are usually distributed over large distances with 
multiple unstaffed locations.
84
     
These elements are concerning because they collectively extend across the primary 
control and security components of SCADA systems.  When considering the level of ease that an 
outside attacker could have when accessing a SCADA system, prioritizing its vulnerabilities can 
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be useful.  First in regards to networks and remote access, it is important to realize that with 
current networking technology there can be multiple access points to any network, and physical 
isolation does not guarantee network security.
85
  There is always the possibility of a connection 
between a local network and the outside world or a connection to another network.  This problem 
multiplies when SCADA system networks are interconnected because of the number of access 
points available are multiplied.  “Over the years, the automation industry has also moved from 
proprietary standards for SCADA communication protocols towards open international 
standards, which make it very easy for attackers to gain in-depth knowledge about the working 
of SCADA networks.
86
”  Network protection and interconnectivity concerns are joined by 
software security as problems that headline SCADA security.  SCADA networks utilize 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software, which are cost efficient but sacrifice 
security.  “Devices that are meant to operate in safety-critical environments are usually designed 
to fail-safe, but security vulnerabilities could be exploited by an attacker to disable to the fail-
safe mechanisms.
87
”  These vulnerabilities create numerous dangerous possibilities in the event 
of a cyber-attack on the system.  “Attackers aim to compromise the SCADA network’s security 
properties such as integrity, confidentiality, authentication, or availability, and since many of the 
SCADA protocols do not support any kind of cryptography, sniffing communications on the 
network are possible if the attacker succeeds in intruding into the network.
88
”  Depending on the 
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level of access that a prospective attacker could gain, there are a number of ways a SCADA 
system could be manipulated.  An attacker could: 
 learn all of the data and control commands while listening to the traffic and could use 
these commands later to send false messages
89
; 
 tamper with the data transmitted over the network and thereby compromise its integrity90; 
 gain unauthenticated access to devices and change their data set points91; 
 change the operator display values so that when an alarm actually goes off, the human 
operator is unaware of it, which would delay the response to an emergency
92
; 
 block or reroute communications to cause significant denial-of-service attacks.93 
 
For those concerned with the security of SCADA systems, the problem becomes 
frustrating knowing that many of these susceptibilities are preventable.  For analysts and others 
who have closely monitored the developing security status of SCADA systems and America’s 
critical infrastructure, the issue of conflicting interests among governmental leadership and the 
private sector has been a confrontation that has merited substantial attention.  The source of the 
problem is that owners and supervisors of critical infrastructure systems and facilities are chiefly 
interested in the resources that promote profit; security is not always one of them.  SCADA 
systems brought in $4.6 billion in revenue in 2009 and are expected to rise to nearly $7 billion in 
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  Because security has not been a primary focus for those who manage vital critical 
infrastructure systems, vulnerabilities have been pervasive.  In addition to the numerous 
vulnerabilities that hamper SCADA system security, these systems feature virtually no security, 
firewalls, routers, or antivirus software to protect them.
95
  However, this effort to cut corners 
ultimately deteriorates the overall security of the system itself.   Being that nearly 85% of all 
critical infrastructure is owned and maintained by the private sector, the U.S. government has 
been challenged with promoting the security and protection of SCADA systems as well as 
critical infrastructure overall.
96
  Cooperation amongst both sides has been a critical subject 
within both national security and critical infrastructure, and will continue to be a progressing 
factor towards future security measures. 
 
The Impact of a SCADA System Attack 
Evidently, the United States government is faced with a tremendous challenge of 
protecting American critical infrastructure.  The potential impact of a foreign assault on 
infrastructure elements such as electrical power and communication capabilities of first 
responders in crises is alarming.  The impact of a cyber-attack ranges from network downtime of 
personal systems to life-threatening destruction of critical infrastructure.
97
  Understandably, US 
critical infrastructure such as financial, electric power and telecommunications may be 
characterized as the element attracting the greatest threat and possessing the greatest 
vulnerabilities within the cyber community; based on the potential impact an attack would have 
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in the way of affecting a large population and causing widespread damage to main pillars of 
American society.   
 Physical Impacts: Effects of paramount importance include personal injury or loss of life.  
Other effects include the loss of property (including data) or damage to the environment.  
Serious health risks would likely emerge as many American citizens would be without 
the basic essentials that support function within society.  One such result that could 
contribute to this factor is the elimination of public facilities being able to be utilized.  
Without electricity primarily, citizens would not have access to resources such as 
airports, grocery stores, hospitals, fire systems and schools which may further accentuate 
health problems. 
 Economic Impacts: Economic impacts are a second-order effect from physical impacts 
ensuing from cyber intrusion.  Physical impacts could result in repercussions to system 
operations, in which in turn inflict a greater economic loss on the facility or company.  
On a larger scale, these effects could negatively impact, regional, national, or possibly 
global economy98. 
 Social Impacts: Another second-order effect, the consequence from the loss of national or 
public confidence in an organization is many times overlooked.  It is, however, a very 
real target and one that can accomplished through a cyber-attack.  Widespread panic and 
paranoia would likely follow after an effective attack on American critical infrastructure.  
The population may be may constantly be worried about the cleanliness of drinking water 
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and the reliability of other government provided services.  Social impacts may possibly 
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Conclusion: Policy Options 
 
Thorough system, threat, and vulnerability assessments have brought forth a number of 
conclusions with serious national security implications.  The SCADA system analysis provided 
an understanding of what SCADA systems are, what their basic network and control functions 
include, and how these components interact.  The threat analysis indicated that the intent and 
capabilities of the primary prospective threats to SCADA system security such as hackers and 
malware, insiders, terrorist organizations, and state actors collectively bring a high level of threat 
to SCADA system security.  The vulnerability analysis indicated that based on the easy-to-
moderate level of ease that is required to hack into a SCADA system and the subsequent damage 
that could possibly ensue in a worst-case scenario, it is evident that SCADA system security is 
highly vulnerable to attack.  With these inferences in mind, it will be vital for analysts and policy 
makers to be cognizant of the vulnerabilities that characterize SCADA systems and the threats 
that constantly seek to exploit them.   
Solutions: 
 As the capabilities and elements of technology continue to become enhanced and 
developed, it would be beneficial for those faced with the task of upholding the security 
of SCADA systems to be both adaptable and welcoming in regards to new methodologies 
of network system security. 
 US government engagement with private sector owners and operators of critical 
infrastructures would help mitigate the threats of cyber terrorism.  This solution could be 
found in the form of more strict governmental security regulations on critical 
infrastructure systems. 
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 SCADA system software must be altered with security as a priority.  It would 
advantageous for these systems to possess situational awareness that provides real-time 
security alerts along with certain solutions to security breaches.  This application could be 
multi-layered across the various zones and sections that constitute system makeup.   
 It would be strategic to enhance the regulatory safety mandates that influence and dictate 
the basic guidelines of American critical infrastructure. 
 It would be gainful to implement stricter legal fees, fines and compliance costs for those 
who do not install and administer proper security measures. 
 
Taking these steps could be the first critical steps towards ensuring that the United States is 
safe from both external and internal threats in the cyber realm.  The potential impact that 
disrupted critical infrastructure utilities would have on America economically, physically, and 
socially makes SCADA system security a vital issue.  Factoring in the vulnerabilities that 
characterize SCADA systems and the threats that seek to exploit those weaknesses makes this an 
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